I n t r o d u c t i o n The d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s f a i l u r e a s nonperformance o r an unacceptable want of success. (The d e f i n i t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e s u l t s should have been avoided).
I n an emerging technology such a s o u r s , t h e boundaries of e x p e c t a t i o n s and "unacceptable success" a r e o f t e n ill defined. F a i l u r e s a r e o f t e n touted a s hugh successes ( o c c a s i o n a l l y r i g h t f u l l y so) and e x c e p t i o n a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l achievement can become dismal f a i l u r e ( i f e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e too high).
We a l l , however, have experienced problems of one s o r t o r another and t h e b a s i c purpose of t h e workshop was simply t o communicate t h e s e so t h a t new o r f u t u r e workers don't make t h e same mistakes.
Summary of Discussions

Marston began t h e d i s c u s s i o n w i t h a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of a number of s p e c i f i c f a i l u r e s , many of which occurred during t h e technology's infancy when we d i d n ' t understand s t a b i l i t y , t r a n s p o s i t i o n , f r i c t i o n a l h e a t i n g e t c . * I<e emphasized t h a t t h e technology i s now adequately mature t h a t f u t u r e problems w i l l r e s u l t p r im a r i l y from t h e f a i l u r e t o u s e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e information r a t h e r than from some h i t h e r t o unknown p h y s i c a l phenomena.
2.2
Desportes d i s c u s s e d two a s p e c t s of system design which are of continued concern. The f i r s t being t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n technology and d e s i g n approach f o r l a r g e and f o r s m a l l systems and t h e second, t h e problems of manufacturing technology. He described a problem w i t h t h e l a r g e , t h i n solenoid f o r t h e CELLO experiment wherein d e s p i t e a c a r e f u l and c o n s e r v a t i v e d e s i g n and v e r i f i c a t i o n t e s t program, t h e magnet f a i l e d because of a t i n y i n c l u s i o n i n t h e monolithic conductor causing i t t o break. F o r t u n a t e l y t h e break was n e a r t h e end of t h e solenoid and was a b l e t o b e r e p a i r e d . He commented t h a t m u l t i s t r a n d c a b l e w i t h adequate c a p a c i t y t o allow a few breaks might have avoided t h e problem.
Dave
Hackley then introduced a new p o t e n t i a l problem which i s r e l a t e d t o t h e r e c e n t r a p i d expansion of a c t i v i t y i n l a r g e magnet systems. This i s t h e need 'Chairman.
*those t h i n g s which, w i t h t h e wisdom of h i n d s i g h t , a r e s o obvious t h a t we should recognize our c a p a b i l i t y f o r s t u p i d i t y ( a r e f l e c t i o n which may s e r v e us w e l l i f we a r e t o avoid f u t u r e f a i l u r e s ) .
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JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE f o r d e f i n i t i o n and d e l i v e r y of c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r minimum r i s k operation. The General Dynamics LCT c o i l i s one of s i x d i f f e r e n t designs from s i x d i f f e r e n t manuf a c t u r e r s . Documentation d e l i v e r e d w i t h t h e c o i l is s o voluminous t h a t t h e r e i s a r e a l danger t h a t c e r t a i n s a f e t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i l l be overlooked. GD has recognized t h e p o t e n t i a l hazard and i s now w r i t i n g concise o p e r a t i n g and s a f e t y procedures. Hackley a l s o noted t h a t h i s conference paper discussed many of t h e design and manufacturing problems encountered w i t h t h e i r "Large Coil".
2.4 Morpurgo i d e n t i f i e d some problems due t o mistakes during design, cons t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n and emphasized t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s most common. The most worrisome problems during design of new and d i f f e r e n t systems a r e " t h e t h i n g s you d o n ' t t h i n k of".
He described a problem w i t h t h e e a r l y Big European Bubble Chamber due t o an u n a n t i c i p a t e d torque on t h e untransposed conductor (Ref. Para. 3.4) . Problems during c o n s t r u c t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y during o p e r a t i o n of b o t h superconducting and conventional magnets r e s u l t from inadequate a t t e n t i o n t o i n s p e c t i o n and s a f e t y procedures ( t a k i n g s h o r t c u t s , ceasing t o worry about w e l l behaved s v s t e n s , e t c . ) .
It i s n o t unusual t o s e e p r o t e c t i v e c i r c u i t s bypassed o r p r o t e c t i v e devices eliminated (or n o t replaced when they f a i l ) .
2.5 Lynn Young discussed some of t h e d e t a i l e d problems during t h e design and c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e Westinghouse "Large Coil" a r i s i n g from t h e requirement t o dev e l o p an advanced conductor (NbgSn, ICCS) simultaneously w i t h t h e development of a s e v e r e l y constrained (by t h e o r i g i n a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n ) c o i l design. Their experience i s a good example of t h e problems t o be expected when working w i t h unproven ranufacturinp, technology.
Be emphasized t h e need f o r e a r l y , formalized F a u l t and Risk Analysis which should i n c l u d e t h e manufacturing technology and equipment when new processes have t o be developed t o s a t i s f y d e s i g n requirements.
2.6 These comments l e d n a t u r a l l y t o a d i s c u s s i o n by P e t e r Komarek of s a f e t y a n a l y s i s about which h e i s t h e author (with F r i e d r i c h Arendt) of an e x c e l l e n t paper. /1/ P e t e r described t h e "painful" questioning by r e a c t o r s a f e t y people a s f u s i o n e n t e r s t h e engineering phase and concluded t h a t we d o n ' t have t h e informat i o n t h a t we should t o p r e d i c t p r o b a b i l i t y of f a i l u r e a v a i l a b i l i t y , , l i f e t i m e , e t c . He described a few of t h e more important f a u l t s and abnormal o p e r a t i n g conditions which a magnet should s u r v i v e ( s e e Ref. 1 ) and a l s o pointed out t h e dangers of accepting performance demands (from t h e p h y s i c i s t s ) which r e s u l t i n machine designs having inadequate conservatism f o r r e l i a b l e o p e r a t i o n .
2.7 Van H u l s t ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n underscored two elements of f a i l u r e . The f i r s t being t h a t a l l system components have a f i n i t e l i f e t i m e and designs should accommod a t e t h e i r r o u t i n e i n s p e c t i o n , replacement and t h e consequences of premature f a i l u r e . In a high f i e l d f a c i l i t y such a s Nijmegen, one such component i s winding i t s e l f f o r which burnout i s n o t uncommon. I n t h e f a i l u r e r e p o r t e d , however, an a r c occurred which caused c u r r e n t t o flow r a d i a l l y i n c e r t a i n elements of a dewar s t r u c t u r e . The Lorentz i n t e r a c t i o n of t h i s c u r r e n t w i t h t h e l a r g e a x i a l f i e l d component t w i s t e d t h e dewar a p a r t . The a c c i d e n t i s a good example of t h e v e r y s t r o n g (and u n a n t i c i p a t e d ) f o r c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s which can occur during abnormal c o n d i t i o n s i n a magnetic system. 2.8 The f i n a l p a n e l i s t , Keith Kibbe, i s involved w i t h t h e t e c h n i c a l c o n t r a c t management f o r LCP and was t h e r e f o r e asked t o comment on t h e f i n d i n g s and recommenda t i o n s of t h e 1979 U. S. DOE " E l e c t r i c a l Problems Committee Report" which concluded t h a t many of t h e problems had t h e i r r o o t s i n management.
(The s a l i e n t ' comments of t h e r e p o r t a r e reproduced below).
Although i t was t h e g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of both t h e p a n e l and t h e audience t h a t management was n o t a s e r i o u s problem, t h e chairman emphasized t h a t t h e management of l a r g e , first-of-a-kind, h i g h technology p r o j e c t s i s t r i c k y b u s i n e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f a l a r g e (and new) team must be put i n p l a c e t o comp l e t e t h e p r o j e c t . The f o r c e containment s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e winding was f a b r i c a t e d from a l a r g e number of h i g h s t r e n g t h aluminum elements which were keyed and b o l t e d t o s e t h e r . The design was complex, t h e r e were m u l t i p l e load p a t h s and t h e m a t e r i a l was b r i t t l e a t low temperature. Although t h e s e f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d , t h e p r i n c i p a l cause of f a i l u r e was a design e r r o r w h e r e i n t h e s t r e s s a n a l y s i s did n o t i d e n t i f y a very h i g h l o c a l s t r e s s associated-with deformation from a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l t r a n s v e r s e load.
Although
3.2
An e a r l y NASA s p l i t c o i l p a i r f a i l e d a s a r e s u l t of r a d i a l deformation of t h e winding a t i t s i n s i d e diameter t h u s allowing one of t h e I . D . t u r n s t o s l i p a x i a l l y . Designers s t i l l o f t e n underestimate t h e s t i f f n e s s of winding composites and t h u s underestimate deformations, winding s t r e s s e s and t h e percentage of winding load taken by o u t e r support s t r u c t u r e .
. On t h e f i r s t cooldown of t h e Argonne 12' Bubble Chamber it was impossible t o f i l l t h e helium v e s s e l adequately t o cover t h e top c o i l . The c i r c u m f e r e n t i a l dimension of t h e annular v e s s e l was s o l a r g e t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e drop of t h e b o i l o f f g a s flowing around t h e h a l f circumference t o t h e ( s i n g l e ) v e n t p i p e depressed t h e l i q u i d l e v e l (180' from t h e v e n t p i p e ) . Modification t o a l l o w v e n t i n g a t two locat i o n s solved t h e problem.
. 4 There have been a number of problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h u n a n t i c i p a t e d f o r c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s . Morpurgo's experience w i t h t h e Big European Bubble Chamber was t h e r e s u l t of t h e Lorentz i n t e r a c t i o n of p a r a s i t i c c u r r e n t loops induced i n t h e untransposed conductor by t h e r a d i a l f i e l d component ( n e a r t h e end of t h e s o l e n o i d a l w i n d i n g ) . A change i n f i e l d t h u s c r e a t e d a torque on t h e conductor u n t i l t h e induced p a r a s i t i c c u r r e n t s decayed. The t w i s t i n g conductor c r e a t e d a n i n t e r m i t t e n t s h o r t t o t h e cryos t a t . A f t e r c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n i t was decided t o open up t h e magnet and f i n d t h e cause of t h e problem (good d e c i s i o n -good l e s s o n ) .
On t h e f i r s t t e s t of t h e two r e g i o n h i g h f i e l d superconducting magnet a t McGill, t h e o u t e r (NbTi) r e g i o n was energized f i r s t w i t h zero c u r r e n t i n t h e i n n e r NbgSn t a p e region.
Induced, diamagnetic c u r r e n t s and r e s u l t i n g Lorentz f o r c e s crushed t h e i n n e r region.
3.5 S e v e r a l of t h e e a r l y magnets s u f f e r e d from f l u x jumps ( l a r g e f i l a m e n t , unt w i s t e d conductors). One was t h e 1969 MIT Hybrid's slperconducting r e g i o n wherein, although t h e conductor was f u l l y s t a b l e , t h e energy i n t h e f l u x jumps was adequate t o blow t h e helium completely o u t of t h e c o o l i n g channels.
Many of t h e e a r l y magnets a l s o s u f f e r e d from poor thermal i n s u l a t i o n , poor e l e c t r i c a l i n s u l a t i o n and "hard t o f i n d and r e p a i r " vacuum l e a k s .
Continued problems such a s t h e s e r e l a t e t o a l a r g e degree t o a simple l a c k of proven manufacturing technology. New d e v i c e s and p r o c e s s e s , however simple they may b e , a r e i n v a r i a b l y f r a u g h t w i t h n a s t y l i t t l e s u r p r i s e s of t h e type r e f e r e n c e d e a r l i e r by Lynn Young. One of t h e Westinghouse LCP conductor problems was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s m a l l m e t a l l i c " s l i v e r s " which were " r o l l e d " o u t of t h e ICCS s h e a t h by t h e t u b e m i l l . The LEL TPC magnet f a i l e d f o r t h e same reason. A p i e c e of metal which was " r o l l e d " o f f t h e s u r f a c e of t h e winding t u b e punctured t h e i n s u l a t i o n causing a s h o r t which f o r t h e ( n e c e s s a r i l y ) h i g h c u r r e n t d e n s i t y winding of a " r a d i a t i o n t h i n " magnet such a s TPC proved t o b e c a t a s t r o p h i c .
Magnet problems a r e o f t e n i n i t i a t e d by o t h e r elements of t h e system. ESCAR, f o r i n s t a n c e , f a i l e d a s a r e s u l t of a power supply which wouldn't s h u t o f f when t o l d t o (by t h e p r o t e c t i o n c i r c u i t s ) . PLUTO s u f f e r e d a n a r c d u r i n g an unnecessary "dump" caused by a f a l s e s i g n a l . A number of such problems have been r e p o r t e d . Many a r e t h e r e s u l t of i n a t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l during t h e f i n a l s t a g e s of
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JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE c o n s t r u c t i o n and e a r l y t e s t (when money i s low, time i s s h o r t , and t e c h n i c i a n s a r e weary) .
Conclusion
The technology h a s s u f f e r e d t h e u s u a l growing p a i n s and problems and a few f a i l u r e s of s e r i o u s proportion and consequence.
It h a s a l s o produced some magnif i c e n t achievements.
It i s t o o soon f o r conclusions more profound than t h a t .
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ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION L a b o r a t o r i e s and companies responded openly and candidly t o t h i s review.
I n many c a s e s , they were anxious t o recommend changes t h a t can be made t o improve t h e e l e c t r i c a l equipment s i t u a t i o n .
@
Laboratory management d i d not appear t o be very i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s review (PPPL was a n exception t o t h i s comment) ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE FINDINGS Lack of P r o j e c t Approach Hampers o b t a i n i n g t r o u b l e f r e e , t e s t e d equipment. e (TFTR and MFTF have made good p r o g r e s s i n t h i s a r e a ) R e s u l t s i n l a c k of c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Resource l i m i t a t i o n s have r e s u l t e d i n
Lack of i n t e r e s t on t h e p a r t of l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s e Limited small company p a r t i c i p a t i o n e Compromises i n t e c h n i c a l performance Resource l i m i t a t i o n s along w i t h schedule p r e s s u r e s have r e s u l t e d i n "short cuts" being taken t h a t have r e s u l t e d i n c o s t and schedule problems l a t e r on. The program h a s evolved t o t h e p o i n t where t h e hardware requirements and elec-. t r i c a l equipment must be managed a s f u l l y engineered systems Engineering must be a f u l l p a r t n e r w i t h physics Early systems d e f i n i t i o n , c o n f i g u r a t i o n and i n t e r f a c e d e f i n i t i o n and a n a l y s i s of t e c h n i c a l and schedule r i s k s have been inadequate t o minimize problems w i t h hardware components and systems performance. The f u s i o n program can b e n e f i t from a commonality of e l e c t r i c a l equipment including MFE s t a n d a r d s Spare p o l i c y
0
Pooling of equipment and s p a r e p a r t s Problems i n e l e c t r i c a l equipment have r e s u l t e d from:
Incomplete s p e c i f i c a t i o n and procurement documents by t h e buyer Less than thorough a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e s e documents e I n s u f f i c i e n t t e c h n i c a l involvement by t h e u s e r s t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e i n t h e s u p p l i e r s and s u b -t i e r s u p p l i e r s p l a n t s during design, f a b r i c a t i o n , and t e s t i n g a c t i v i t i e s Inadequate communications between buyer and s e l l e r Inadequate equipment documentation from s u p p l i e r Inadequate t e s t i n g b o t h by s u p p l i e r and u s e r I n s u f f i c i e n t c a r e i n using "standard" equipment i n "non-standard" applicat i o n s The program h a s reached t h e phase where q u a l i t y assurance and r e l i a b i l i t y cons i d e r a t i o n ' m u s t be c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d I n s u f f i c i e n t open d i s c u s s i o n of hard engineering problems w i t h i n t h e MFE program.
ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
A d d i t i o n a l s t e p s should b e taken by t h e MFE l a b o r a t o r i e s t o p r o j e c t i z e and t o i n c o r p o r a t e p r o j e c t methodology i n t o e l e c t r i c a l equipment development and purchase a c t i v i t i e s .
C l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a must. DOE should t a k e t h e n e c e s s a r y s t e p s t o f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t t h e l a r g e e l e c t r i c a l equipment s u p p l i e r s and t o a s s u r e t h e s m a l l companies of t h e i r continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o supply r e l i a b l e , proven e l e c t r i c a l equipment needed t o s u p p o r t t h e MFE program. This should a l s o p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e d e s i g n , manufacturing, t e s t i n g and o p e r a t i o n of e l e c t r i c a l equipment. Funding and s c h e d u l a r a l l o c a t i o n s should be r e v i s e d t o s u p p o r t o b t a i n i n g rel i a b l e working equipment and f a c i l i t i e s . Engineering should b e made an e q u a l p a r t n e r w i t h p h y s i c s . Action should b e taken t o r e q u i r e e a r l y system d e f i n i t i o n , c o n f i g u r a t i o n and i n t e r f a c e d e f i n i t i o n and formal a n a l y s i s of t e c h n i c a l and s c h e d u l e r i s k s t o minimize problems w i t h hardware components and systems performance. DOE should work w i t h IEEE t o e s t a b l i s h a f u s i o n power e n g i n e e r i n g committee t o g e n e r a t e s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e MFE program. DOE should e s t a b l i s h a s p a r e s p o l i c y i n c l u d i n g d e l i v e r y of i n i t i a l s p a r e p a r t s w i t h equipment. T h i s should i n c l u d e mechanisms f o r s h a r i n g between l a b o r a t o r i e s and p r o j e c t s . DOE should t a k e a c t i o n t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e l a b o r a t o r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h a more uniform procedures and p r a c t i c e s f o r a c q u i r i n g , t e s t i n g , a c c e p t a n c e , i n s t a l l i n g , and documenting e l e c t r i c a l equipment. R e l i a b i l i t y and QA programs should be implemented and u t i l i z e d more e x t e n s i v e l y . Furthermore, a q u a l i t y a s s u r a n c e a u d i t should b e conducted t o e s t a b l i s h t h e l e v e l of QA now b e i n g a p p l i e d and t o make recommendations. The program should promote and encourage more open p r o f e s s i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n of e n g i n e e r i n g problems w i t h i n t h e MFE program.
